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ABSTRACT
The present paper uses a paneldata estimation technique to combine the time series for
individual countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, the United States and Switzerland). We postulated the response of
central banks in these countries to intlation and economic growth given the contraintsto be
the same among the sample countries. Differences between central bank independence
come forward in a different structural pressure to lower or raise money market rates in
these countries. The empirical results in this study coincide remarkably well with the
legal indices of central bank independence (Bade and Parkin (1988); Alesina (1988,
1989); Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991); Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993a))
based on the prevailing central laws. Finally, regressions of the average inflation and
economic growth rate on our empirical index of central bank independence confirm that
having an independent central bank will lead to lower inflation rates without being
accompanied by a reduction of economic growth.2
In the present study, one reaction function is estimated for all countries using
paneldata. This can be done by identifying an individual country-specific ~effect which, of
course, dces differ among the countries. In section 1 we discuss indices of legal central
bank independence. In section 2 the estimation technique is discussed. The results for the
so-called empirical index of central bank independence are given in section 3. In section 4
we investigate these results in more detail to see whether significant changes in empirical
independence can be detected between the first and second half of our sample period.
Also, in this section the numerical values of empirical independence are confronted with
the indices of legal independence. In section 5 a short evaluation is given of what has
been done so far. Hereafter, in section 6 the relation between economic performance and
the several indices of central bank independence (legal as well as empirical) is analyzed.
1. THEORETICAL CENTRAL BANK INDICES I
In recent years some central bank indices have been developed. Basically, these
indices are based on charters of central banks. Therefore, these indices constitute a
measure of legal central bank independence. Eijffinger and Schaling (1992) compare the
major indices. These are the indices of Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989) and
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). From now, these indices will be referred to by,
respectively, the BP index, the AL index and the GMT index. After reviewing these
indices Eijffinger and Schaling construct their own index (the ES index2). We will now
briefly discuss the aforementioned theoretical indices of central bank independence3.
t This section is based on Ei,jffinger and Schaling (1992) and on Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a) which is
a more compact venion of the former.
In fact, the ES index is more than a purely legal index of central hnnk independence. The cenlral bank
laws are examined against the background of monet:,ry policy-making. Sce Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a), p. 51. This implie. that the ES index [ries lo grah some of the actual independence. This iz in contrast with the other - purely legal - indices of central bank independence.
3 The numerical values tiir all the.ce indices and some variants are given in table I.3
Table 1
Indices of legal central bank independence.






Australia 1 1 1 1 3 6
Canada 1 2 2 1 4 7
France 2 2 2 1 2 5
German 5 4 4 3 6 7
Ital 2 2 1.5 3 4 1
Ja n 3 3 3 I 1 5
Netherlands 4 2 2 3 6 4
Switzerland 5 4 4 3 5 7
United Kin dom 2 2 2 2 1 5
United States 3 3 3 3 5 7
Sweden 2 2 2 NA NA NA
ES : EijffingerSchaling index;
HP : Bade-Parkin index;
AL : Alesina index;
GMT : Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini index;
NA : Not Availablz;
teria4:
Bade and Parkin created an index for policy independence based on three cri-
l. Is the bank the final policy authority?
2. Is there no govemment official (with or without voting power) on the bank
board?
4 Bade and Parkin also constructeJ a mzaxure for financial independence of central banks from their
governments. However, they did not find a relxtion bztwezn this meaaure and the avorage rate of infla-
tion or the vaziability of inflation. (I'hey used the same couotries as we did plus Belgium.) Because they
did conclude that there is a relation betwcen central bank policy independeace and the average intlation
rate we only focus on this measure here. See Eijffinger and Schaling (1992), pp. 21-24.4
3. Are more than half of the board appointments made independent of the
government?5
On basis of these three criteria the BP index is constructed which ranges from 1(least
independent) to 4(most independent)6. The construction is designed as follows: positive
answers to these questions indicate more independence and every positive answer means
that the central bank is ranked one step higher with only negative answers resulting in an
index of 17. It is important to note here that all three criteria are weighted equally by
Bade and Parkin.
Alesina criticizes Bade and Parkin by noting that they disregarded institutional
changes within the sample periodg. He argues that because of the divorce of the Treas-
ury and the Italian central bank in 1981 the latter bt~;ame more independent. This is
caused by the fact that the Banca d'Italia was no longer obliged to absorb all excess
supply of short-term Treasury bills. Consequently, the central bank of Italy was no longer
obliged to accommodate monetary policy by monetary financing of government deficits.
This implied that the freedom for monetary policy became higher. Therefore, the Banca
d'Italia became more independent.
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a, p. 58) state that Alesina implicitly is extending the
work of Bade and Parkin by introducing a fourth criterium:
4. Is the central bank not required to absorb excess supply of short-term
Treasury bills?
This question has a negative answer for all countries except for ltaly (after 1981).
Eijffinger and Schaling argue that this should have led to an upgrading of the indepen-
dence of the central bank of Italy. Strange enough, Italy is downgradcd from a BP index
of 2 to an AL index of 1.5 while all other countries maintain the Same indcx. Acu~rding
s This question was answered yes if the proportion of inembers which is not direclly nor indirectly
appointed by the government is greater than or equal to I 1~21.
6 Table 1 gives the indicts for OUr S:AInpIC cOUMrle6.
~ In fact only four different cases exist within the sample. The most differing cases are the one with only
positive and the one with only negative answers. Furthermore, we have countries in which yuestion I
and 2 are positively an.cwered and countries in which only question 2 can be answered yes.
8 The period Bude and Parkin considered is 1972 till 1986.5
to Eijffinger and Schaling this makes the AL index internally inconsistent9 and, theref-
ore, the AL index cannot be qualified as a proper index of central bank independenceto.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini designed an index of political independence as
well as an index of economic independence. They defined political independence as the
capacity to choose the final goal of monetary policy, such as the rate of inflation and the
level of economic activity. The GMT Political index is based on the following eight
criteria:
I. Is the governor not appointed by the government?
2. Is the governor appointed for more than five years?
3. Are all board members not appointed by the government?
4. Is the board appointed for more than five years?




Is there no government approval of monetary policy required?
Are there statutory requirements that the bank pursues monetary stability
among its goals?
8. Are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank's position in case of
conflicts with the government?
The overall political index is determined by counting all the positive answers. This
implies that all criteria are weighted equally.
Note that criteria 5 and 6 are identical to criteria 2 and 1 from the BP indez.
GMT's criterion 3 is a more strict version of BP's criterion 3. These three criteria of the
GMT index (3, S and 6) are used by Eijffinger and Schaling to create a GMT Policy
index that is comparable with the BP indexlt. Differences between the BP index and
the GMT Policy index exist for two reasons. Firstly, because of possible differences in
9 They mean by internally inconsistent that not all relevant criteria have been used to determine the
independence of each central bank.
10
II
The rca.wn for this is that Ihe numerical values of the Alesina indez in table 4.1 cannot be compared
with each other. See also Eijftinger and Schaling (1993a), p. 59.
Naturally, this GMT Iwlicy index is aggregated in the same manner as the BP index. The baaic
difference between the way the BP index and the original GMT political index are aggregated is that the
bottom value of the BP index is one while the GMT political index can take a zero value.6
the interpretation of central bank laws GMT's criteria 5 and 6(or BP's cri[eria 1 and 2)
are possibly different answerrd. Secondly, the fact that GMT's criterion 3 is more strict
than BP's criterion 3 can lead to differences in the BP index versus the GMT Policy
index. Eijffinger and Schaling call this respectively the interpretation and the criterion
effectt2.
Eijffinger and Schaling criticize the GMT Policy index for two reasons. Firstly,
they argue that by using a very strict criterion concerning the appointments of dirt~tors
the ranking of the Bundesbank, the Swiss National Bank and Banta d'Italia is severely
biased rompared with the ranking of the BP index13. To clarify the second point of
criticism they consider GMT's criteria 6 and 7 in combination with the equal weighting.
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a, p. 66) then note that "restriaing atrentinn fo GMT 6 and
7, a subservient central bank with provisions for monetary stabiliry is as independent as
an autonomous central bank withow fhese provisions". This implies that the contents of
final goals in charters (criterion 7) are judged without regarding the capacity to choose
final goals (criterion 6). For Eijffinger and Schaling this is an argument against equal
weighting because it is obvious that whether a central bank has monetary stability among
its goals is not relevant when it cannot choose its final goals.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini define economic independence as the capacity to
choose the instruments of monetary policy. To measure this economic independence they
use the following seven criteria:
1. Is the direct crt~it facility of the govemment non-automatic?
2. Is it at market interest rates?
3. Is it explicitly temporary?
4. Is it of limited amount?
5. Dces the central bank not participate in the primary market for government
debt?
6. Is the discount rate set by the central bank?
tZ See Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a), p. 63, Wble 6. Thix table gives a decomposition of the differences
between the BP index and the GMT policy index in the interprotalion and the criterion effect.
13 From table t appearx that Gennany and Switzerland are downgradeJ and Italy ix upgraded verwx the
BP index. According to lhe GMT policy index the.}e countries are eyually independent. Thi. is cuunler-
intuitive.7. Is banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank or not entrusted to
the central bank alone?
Unlike in constructing previous indices these criteria are not weighted equally. The first
six have weight 1I8. Criterion 7, however, has weight 218. If central bank supervision is
totally entrusted to the central bank this counts for two positive answers and when it is
only partly entrusted to the central bank criterion 7 counts for one positive answer.
Recognizing this, the positive answers can be aggregated till the measure of economic
independence which, theoretically, can range from zero to eight.
After Eijffinger and Schaling gave an overview of the previous indices, they con-
structed a new index of political independence14. Their index is based on three criteria:
1. Is the bank the sole final authority (b), is this authority not enwsted to the
central bank alone (blg), or is it entrusted completely to the government (g).
2. Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the bank
board? (BP's criterion 2)
3. Are more than half of the boazd appointments made independent of the
government? (BP's criterion 3)
As with the index of Bade and Parkin the minimal value of the index is 1. A positive
answer to criterion 2 raises the index by one. The same applies to criterion 3. Criterion
1, however, has double weight. A bank of type b means the index of political indepen-
dence is increased by two while the index is raised by one for a type (b~g) bank. This
implies that the numerical values of the index range from 1 to 5. Differences between the
FS index, on the one hand, and the BP indez or the GMT Policy index, on the other
hand, can be decomposed again in an interpretation and a criterion effectt5.
All aforementioned legal indices of central bank independence have some features
in common. Firstly, there is no non-arbitrary way of weighting the several criteria.
Though, it seents intuitive that some criteria should be weighted more than others it is not
clear how large the relative weights should be. Even the choice and the exact formulation
of the criteria is - to some extent - arbitrary. If one bases an index of central bank
independence on a few criteria there is a danger of omitting important determinants of
t~ They use the same definition for political independence as Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini did, i.e. aa
the capacity of cen[ral banks [o choose the final goal of monetary policy.
IS See Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a), p. 67 and p. 69, tables 8 and 9.8
central bank independence. On the other hand, basing an index for central bank indepen-
dence on a lot of criteria leads to a'watering down' of the real important determinants of
central bank independence when equal weighting is used.
Sewndly, even the interpretation of central bank charters appears to be subjective
to some extent. This causes differences between the several indices as a result of the
interpretation effect.
Thirdly, as noted by Cukierman1ó, these legal indices only measure one aspect
of actual central bank independence. Other aspects of central bank independence are, for
instance, informal arrangements, tradition and culture of monetary stability, the quality of
the bank's research departtnent and personalities of important persons in the bank or
political authorities that try to influence the monetary policy17.
2. THE PANELDATA ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
As Cukierman (1992, p. 369) notes leeal independence is not the same as actual
independence. Cukierman argues that there are at least two reasons for this divergence.
Firstly, central bank laws are incomplete. It is impossible to specify the limits of the
authority of the central bank and the political authorities in all situations. These limits are,
among others, determined by informal arrangements, traditions and personalities of
persons that are confronted with these unspecified situations. Secondly, even if the scope
of authority, procedures, objectives, etc. are described explicitly in the law, actual
practice may be differenttg.




See Cukierman (1992), p. 3G9 and section 19.7, pp. 393-395.
This may be criticized if one conceives central bank independence structurally. Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991, p. 366), for example, acknowledge that "the irtdeprrulence ajd~e Bundesbank i.r the
result of specific cennnl Gank laws but aLro rJ its rrputation urul a tradirion of manerary di.rcipline.
Nence, by neglecring behaviourial indicarors we ntiss an importatu dintearion of monetary regimes".
Nevertheless, [hey contine themselves [o a purely legal - structural - index of central bank independence because: 'belravioutial indicators have ojtrn varied over áme (e.g. witlt personalities in charge of
monetary policyJ wleerras rrwnetary institutions have generally been ntore invariant and, ro the extent
dtat there have been iactitwiona! refornu, Ntey are more clearly idennfiab(e".
In [his respect it is interesting that Cukierman (1992, p. 421) finds results indicating that the divergence
between the law and ac[ual practice in developing countnes is substantially higher than in developed countries.9
hardly or not quantifiable we will now assume that actual independence cannot be
measured directly19. We assume that the reaction of central banks to inflation and
economic growth data not only depends on these variables but also on an individual
unknown country-specific effect. We will interpret this country-specific effect as the
~,~( independence of central banks. This means that the symmetrical reaction function
which was taken from Koskela and Virén (1991) takes the following formZO:
AMMRt1 ' ~o t ptP~~ t pzPt.r-t i~jYll t p~yij-t t CBII t t~u (1)
with i-1..N, t-1..T and
~MMRi t .- change in money market rate of country i in period t,
Pi t .- inflation rate of country i in period t,
Yi t .- real economic growth rate of country i in period t,
CBIi .- actual central bank independence of country i,
ni t .- the error term for country i in periad t.Zt
The subscript i represents the countries in our sample and t is the time subscript.22
Because we would like to infer conclusions about a country-specific effect which
cannot be observed directly we resort to the use of paneldata. Furthermore, we assume
this central bank independence not to change a lot over the sample period in a particular
19
20
This dces not mean, though, that legal independence (and perhaps other facton) can not be uaed as a
proxy for actual independence. Later in this chapter we will try w find empirical measurea of actusl
independence, and, using this measure of actual independence we will test whether actual ittdependence
can be approximated by legal independence.
Actually we should write (35CB1;, but this term can only be estimated in a composite form. We are not
able to disentangle the consunt ccefficient {45 and the country-specific effect CBti. So, without loss of
generality BS can be normalized at one.
We assume the error term q; t to ba an independently, idenlically distributed nndom variable with mean
zero and variance o~'-. Furthermore, we assume that the error term is independent of the regresaon.
Moreover, when we use F-statistics or t-statistics we, implicitly, make the assumption that the ercor
term is nonnally distributed.
We will considar the following ten countries (N-10): Austnlia, Canada, Fnnce, Germany, Italy,
]apan, the Nethrrlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Thia meana - in
comparison to our previous analyses - that we excluded Swedeo. This is because of the fact that we
were faced with a tradeoff between the number of countries to include and the number of obcervations
per country that could be included. Bacause we are using paneldats we need data for all countriea for
the whole sample period. This means that the countries with little observations determice the length of
the samplr pericxl. By rxcluding Swrden, our aample period rangea from the third quarter of 1977
(t-1) to lhr last yuarter ut' 1990 (t-T-54).lo
country23. Therefore, the unobservable individual country-specific effect is fixed and
this brings us to the fixed-effects models within the paneldata approach.
We will now describe the estimation technique for fixed-effects models using
paneldata24. For convenience we introduce the following notation:
~ .- (~t, ~2, Q3, ~q)r,
xi.t '- (Pi,t~ Pi.t-I~ Yi,t~ Yi.t-1)~~ i-1..N, t-1..T,
EMPi :-~o t CBii, i-1.. N.
Now one is able to rewrite (1) as:
AMMR;J - EMP; t (1lx;J } rl;~ with i-1..N, t-1..T (2)
Note that we have comprised the common intercept ( ip and the country-specific effect
CBIi together to EMPi. The reason for this is that because both terms are fixed constants
we cannot identify or estimate them separately25. We will refer to EMPi as the gener-
alized individual effect or the empirical independence of central banks to distinguish it
from the country-specific effect or the actual independence of central banks (CBIi). To
continue our exposure we also need the following notations:
OMMR; .- (~MMRi t, ... , ~MMRi T)', i-1..N,
e .- (1, .. , 1)',
Xi '- (xi,l~~ " ~ xi.Tr)~~ i-1..N,
ni .- (r1i,1, ... , r1i,T)r~ i-1..N.
Now equation (2) can be written as26:
24
:5
We expect legal independence to cons[i[u[e Ihe normal (mean) level of central bank independence and
changes over time are due to gradual changes in the tradition and culture of monetary stability and
because of different persnnalities in policy boards of centrat banks and in institutions [hat try to
influence the actions of the central banks. However, for the time being, we a.csumt these changes to be
marginal and neglect them.
Concerning lhe impor4.nce of different per.wns in the pulicy buard ut a ccrrtral bar~Y ir w rllunrtanve ro
yuote Friedman (1962, p. 234). He states [hut a "tlrjru uj the carulud r~ nurnetnry pr.bty drrnuxh nn
ind[p[nd[nt crnrrul bunk tlrul has u gtKUl deul oj ([ewqv urul powrr i.~ th[ acrrnt tn whu~h paLry c~
thereby mad[ higlrly depenArnt an pecronnlities". Retérring to Fnedman's anc~le BaIIC anJ Parkm
(1988, p. 21) state that there is a 'lmge patrnriat for individuuf GovernorlUirecror prrjennc[sandjor
persona! s!r[ngths urul weukness[s rn influ[nc[ pnlicy in u Xenuinely inJrperulrnrcentrul bunk".
The fixed-effects model approach is described in Hsiao (1986), pp. 29-32.
Unless, we have additional restrictions. If we, for example, introduce [he restriction that the sum of all
CBIi's must be zero then it is possible to identify both (3p as well as all CBIi's. The individual effects then can be interpreted ac the deviation of the individual country from the common mean (ip. See Hsiao (1986, p. 32).
`6 The conditions for tf t mtntioned in fc~otnote 21 imply for qi:11
GMMR; - EMPe . X;(i i tl. (i-1..N) (3)
Define matrix Q as Q: -IT-ee'IT. IT denotes the identity matrix with dimensions T by T.
Pre-multiplying equation (3) with Q has the effect of transforming all observations into
deviations of their individual means. Performing
gives:
this transformation on equation (3)
QAMMR; - QX;(i t Qrl; (i-1..N)
Note that transforming a constant into a deviation of its individual mean gives
(4)
zero.
Therefore, the term EMPie disappears in (4). Applying OLS to (4) gives the following
within-group estimator27:
N -1 N
a~ - (~ X~QX;) (~ X;QAMMR;)
t.t ~-t
Now we can estimate EMPi by:




with AMMR; :- 1~ ~MMR;j, x; :- 1~ x;1
Tr.l T,.1
Furthermore, it is possible to derive that the covariance matrix of the witfiin-group







o~ - t ~(AMMR; - E1NP;wor - X;(3w~~(OMMR; - EMP;,~e - X;~~ (g)
NT-(N.k) ~~t
and
(í) E(11;) - 0 for i- 1..N
(íi) E(~l;Tl~) - a~fr .lor i - 1..N
~ -0 ori, - 1..NAi. (iií) E(T);rl~) Í l Í
with IT denoting the T by T identity matrix.
This estimator is called Ihis way because only the variation within each group (country) is uaed. Other
names which aometimes are used for this estimator are covariance estimator or least-squares dummy-
variable (iSDh estimator. The first name stems from the fact that madela like equation (4.2) are also
called analysis~f-covariance models. The name ISDV estimator finds its origin in the fact ehat we also
can estimate this mudal using dummies, as we will see later on.12
,z 0
V(EMPt.wc) - X~V(pwc)Xi } T (9)
The parameter k denotes the number of regressors. So, k-4 in our case. In general, this
analysis can be done for any fixed cross-sectional unit-specific effect. We assumed, how-
ever, that the individual country-specific effect can be contributed to the independence of
central banks. Therefore, we labelled this country-specific effect CBI;.
Basically, the just discussed approach implies that all countries have the same
coefficients in front of the exogenous variables but that the intercepts are different among
the several countries. Two remarks can be made here. Firstly, because of equation (2)
this approach is also called a variable-intercept model. Secondly, we also could have esti-
mated the model by introducing ten dummies - for each country one - that take over the
role of the variable intercepts. The fixed effects method - although being equivalent to the
variable intercept method - is discussed above because, in my opinion, the interpretation
of the country-specific effects now comes forward in a more natural way.
Furthermore, we can see from this equivalence as well as from the fact that we
can apply OLS to equation (4) that under the proper conditions for the error term28 the
within-group estimator is BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator).
3. THE RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
In the previous section we have seen that we can estimate actual central bank
independence using paneldata. We only have to accept the identification of the country-
specific effect with the degree of independence of central banks. This seems plausible
because, on the one hand, we already mentioned that the money market rate is - almost
completely - determined by the instruments of the central bank. And, on the other hand,
because we defined central bank independence as the ability and willingnesl of thc c;c:ntral
bank to conduct monetary policy which is directed to price stability as the single policy
objective. This definition of central bank independence implies that the same degree of
independence should lead to the same response to data for economic growth and inflation
rate.29 A central bank that is less independent will be tempted to lower the money
~8 See footno[e 21 for these conditions.
29 Though, the response also depends on the way [he economy is organized. A different structure of the economy implies somewhat different reactions to actions of central banks and, therefore, somewhat13
market rate to stimulate economic growth and, thereby, employment. This implies that
this sort of central bank will tend to have a relatively lowec money market rate than more
independent central banks. Relatively means here regarding the inflation and economic
growth data.30 So, we expect less independent central banks to show a lower individual
effect (CBI) and, consequently, a lower generalized individual effect (EMP) in reaction
function (2)31. Therefore, the degree of central bank independence may be identified
with a country-specific effect in the determination of the money market rate. This was
already stated in reaction function (1). When we refer to empiriral independence of
central banks, we mean the estimated generalized country-specific effects (EMP). We aze
not referring to the country-specific effects (CBI), because we are only able to estimate
these in a composite form. This is no problem because our main interest is not the exact
value of these effects but their ranking. From former discussion it will be clear that this
empirical independence will be used as a proxy for actual independence.
The estimation results of reaction function (2) using paneldata are given in table 2
and the following equation:
AMMRi t- EMPi f 0.136Pi t t 0.125Pi t-t f 0.393Y; t f 0.145Yi t-t f t1i,t (10)
[1.901] [1.730] [6.776] [2.513]
and o,~2 - 1.691.
Absolute t-values for estimated ccefficients are given between brackets. These
results aze conform our intuition. Judging the signs of the ccefficients we see that the
different constraints on the behaviour ofcentral banks.
30
In general, countries with an independent central bank win have lower mean inflatioo rates than
countries with more dependent central banks. See, for instance, Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b) or
Cukiennan (1992), chap[er 18 and 20, for theory and empirical evidence confirming this statement.
This implies [hat, notwithstnnding the fact that the money market ra[e in latter countries will be
relatively tower, they actually may have a higher money market rate. According to theory and empirical
evidence the degreo of independance dces no[ influence the mean level of economic growth. See
Eijffinger and Schaling (t9936). These relations between central bank independence and the mean (and
variance) of lhe inflation rate, the rate of economic growth and [he money market rate are investigated
in Kcliun (1.
31 Note that EMPi - p0 t CBIi. Becat~se ii0 is eqllal fOr all central banks and because the individual
effect CBIi is expected to be lower for more dependent central banks the composite ccefficient EMPi is
also expected to be lowar for mora dependen[ central banks.14
common reaction to inFlation and economic growth is a higher money market rate which
is the result of a more restrictive monetary policy. On the other hand, the response to
economic growth is strongér than the response to inflation which is not conform our
expectations. If independent central banks will fight inflation and if they have perfect
wntrol over the money market rate, we expect the response to inflation to be more
pronounced than to economic growth32. The response to current as well as lagged
economic growth is strongly significant on a 5 k level, while the same response to both
inflation variables is significant only on a 10~ level, not on a 5k level. The ccefficients
of our prime interest are the ccefficients which measure the differences between the
countries. For ease of comparison, we have ranked the generalized individual effect - i.e.
the empirical independence - in table 2 from high to low.
These coefficients coincide remarkably well with our prior convictions. Among the
ten countries is a first group of three countries (the Netherlands, Switzerland and
Germany) which, obviously, have more independent central banks than the second group
of countries (we will call these central banks strongly independent from now on}~3. On
the other hand, there is one country (Italy) that has by far the least independent central
bank (so, from now on we will classify this central bank as dependent). The other six
countries have an intermediate independent central bank34. Furthermore, we see that all
generalized individual ccefficients (EMP) are significantly different from zero35. This,
however, can also be contributed to the common constant (~p) to be significantly different
from zero. It dces not mean that all individual effects (CBI) have significant effects on the
determination of the money market rate. More important is, however, that the differences
between the three groups of countries are obvious. These differences cannot be contrib-
3, At stcond thought this may be not so remarkable. We are investigating the cnrr,rr,nn behav~our tnwardti
economic grow[h and intlation of ten countries among which some have independnnt centrnl banks and
some have more dependent ones. So, it is well possible [hat the cummon reaetion ix duminated by
economic growth data. After all, the differen[ inFlation-aversion between the cuuntries curnes tirrward in
[he proxy for actualindependence.
33 These three central banks are exactly the cen[ral banks [hat are ranked in the ES-index as having the
sola final au[hority. Sae Eijitinger and Schaling (1993a), p. 65 and p. 67.
34
3S
ln wble 2[he three types of cen[ral banks (strongly independent, interrnedia[e independen[ and
dependent) are separated by double lines.
For the Netherlands this is only true for a(096 significance level. For Switzerland and Germany this is
true on a S~i level. In the other seven countries the intercep[ term is even significant on a 196 level.ls
uted to the common intercept term (~p) but must be due to the actual independence of
central banks (what we labelled CBI). Though, the point estimations for the generalized
individual effects give an obvious ranking, it is important to note that only a few
countries have statistically significant different intercepts3ó. Within the class of stmngly
independent central banks each central bank has a significantly higher level of empirical
independence than the Banca d'Italia. The Nederlandsche Bank has also a significantly
higher level of empirical independence than the Reserve Bank of Australia37.
Table 2
Paneldata estimation results for empirical independence of central banks.





Netherlands -0.331 [1.725] (-0.707, t0.045)
Switzerland -0.404 [2.085] (-0.784, -0.024)
German -0.431 [2.224] (-0.810, -0.051)
United States -0.684 [3.147] -1.111, -0.258)
United Kin dom -0.704 [2.987] (-1.165, -0.242)
Ja an -0.718 [3.445] (-1.126,-0.309)
Canada -0.728 [3.220] (-1.171, -0.285)
France -0.772 [3.369] (-1.221, -0.323)
Australia -0.867 [3.569] (-1.343, -0.391)
Ital -I.155 [4.249] (-1.687,-0.622)
~ Absolute t-values brtween brackets;
36 Of course, it would be too much to expect the generalized individual effect (EMP) for each country to
differ significantly from all olher countries. Ten countries imply ten confidence in[ervals and these are
likely to show - at Itast - some overlap.
37 These comparisons have been made using a 596 significance level.16
Summarizing, we have found a clear ranking of central banks and, furthermore,
for the most eztreme cases (the group of strongly independent central banks versus the
group of one dependent cen[ral bank) these differences are statistically significant.
4. FURTHER REFINING AND INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
We made two important assumptions in section 2. Firs[ly, that the country-specific
effect could be attributed to the degree of actual independence of central banks and,
secondly, that this effect was fixed over time. Because of this latter assumption we used
the estimation technique for fixed-effects models. An alternative assumption could have
been that the country-specific effect has a constant mean but that the actual country-
specific effect will vary around this mean (so, it will equal its mean plus a stochastic
error term). This could be due to, for instance, changing personalities in the policy board
of the central bank and in political authorities that try to influence the central bank.
Because, in general, persons come and go gradually over time38 the actual value of the
central bank independence will also change gradually over time. This means that curren[
values of actual independence are not independent of past values. Therefore, we can per-
form a simple test for this type of time-varying cen[ral bank independence39. We split
up the sample in two sub-samples and we will judge whether the differences between the
two sub-periods are significant or not. The results for the first and the second sub-period
38
39
In Ne United States, for instance, the Board of Governors consists of seven members which all are
appointed for fourteen years by the president. Every two years one Governor is replaced. It should be ooted, though, that this is the most extreme case of gradually replacing members of the policy board of a central bank. See Bade and Parkin (1988), pp. 10-15.
A way to model the alternative behaviour could be:
and
CBItJ ~ itt . vtf with vti - pv.f-t .~y
tu i.i.d. N(O,al~, Ocpct
Here i.i.d, denotes independen[ly, identically distributed. A tes[ whether the individual effects are fixed (Hd or not against this alternative would amount to testing:
He : a, 3 - 0 versus Xt : a z i 0
Note that we did not test our null hypothesis with respect to Ithis particular alternative. It is mentioned here to ge[ insight in the actual process by looking at an attempt to fonnalize this process. Note further that Cukierman (1992, p. 165) also uses the same specification for his parameter A- i.e. the relative emphasis on employment versus price stebility - when he is matelling shifts in this relative concern a.c well as the persistence in [hese shifts. In Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b, p. 6) lhe parameter IIA is identified with the degree of central bank independence.17
are given in table 3 and the following two equations4o:
~ The first sub-period ranges from 1977 Itl - 1984 1 and the second from 1984 11 - 1990 IV.18
GMMRi t- EMPi f 0.185Pi t f 0.253Pi t-t f 0.480Yi t t 0.153Yi t-t f~Ii t (11)
[1.603] [2.109] [5.732] [1.846]
and a,~2-2.386,
t]MMRi t- EMPi f 0.199Pi t f 0.081Pi t-1 f- 0.241Yi t ~- 0.143Yi.t-1 } ni,t (12)
[1.866] [0.778] [2.924] [1.710]
and a,~2-1.032.
Absolute t-values for estimated ccefficients are given between brackets. T'he first
equation is reaction function (2) again but now estimated for the first half of the sample
period. The second equation is the equivalent of the first equation but now for the second
half of the sample period. For both sub-periods the signs of the ccefficients do not differ
from the whole sample period. However, the estimates in the second equation are less
accurate than the estimates of the first equation. The overall contribution of the variables
to the explanation of the variation in AMMR even appears to be insignificant on a 20~
level. This may give rise to doubt the robus[ness of the regression results over time. On
the other hand, in the first sub-period the joint contribution of the regressors in equation
(2) is signifícant on a 1~ leve141. So, our model (equation (2)) dces give a good fit for
the data in the first sub-period but not for data in the second sub-period. A closer look at
the determination of central bank independence tells us that these results may be not so
remarkable after all. Within the second sub-period the intention of the EMS countries (in
our sample: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and partly the United Kingdom) was
- more and more - to have converging monetary policies. This implied more weight to the
exchange rate target and, therefore, that monetary policy became more and more endoge-
nous42. Now factors like the exchange rate vis-à-vis other EMS countries (especially
4t Also for the whole sample period the ovarall contribution of [he regressors to ttie explanation of the
variation in lsIvtMR is signiticant on a 14E level.
42 See, for instance, Eijftinger and Schaling (19936), p. 14. Ungerer (I990) divides the development of
the EMS in three phases. The first phase (1979-198211983) wac a period of orientation. After
1982I1983 up to 1987 there was a period of conaolidation. This marks the second phase and according
to Ungerer (1990, p. 338) this period 'was characterized by a wide.tpread consensur to follow srabiliry-
onented policies, an increasing convergence in tlte developmenr of costs, prices and monetary
aggregates, and by fong periods withour rmlignments of eentra! ratts". The third phase from (987 IiII
the present was a period of re~xamination in the light of uneasiness about the 'asymmetry" of the
system. See, for example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) for an interesting paper about the advantages of
being tied to an exchange rate within the EMS. In Von Hagen (1993) the development of the EMS and19
Germany) and the money market rates in these countries aze important for the determi-
nation of the money market rate. Hence, the fact that our model dces not represent the
actual process in the second sub-period is explained.
Table 3







Netherlands -0.33 (1) -0.59 (1) -0.22 (1)
Switzerland -0.40 (2) -0.65 (2) -0.27 (2
German -0.43 (3) -0.69 (3) -0.29 (3)
United States -0.68 (4) -1.06 (5) -0.65 (8
United Kin dom -0.70 (5) -1.31 (8) -0.50 (5)
Ja -0.72 (6) -1.05 (4) -0.50 (4)
Canada -0.73 (7) -1.25 (6) -0.57 (6)
France -0.77 (8) -1.38 (9) -0.61 (7)
Australia -0.87 (9) -1.26 (7) -0.86 (10)
Ital -1.16 ( I0) -2.10 (10) -0.86 (9)
Whole sample period : 1977 lll - 1990 IV;
First sub-period : 1977 III - 1984 1;
Second sub-periocl : 1984 11 - 1990 IV;
Rankings in the different periods are given in pxrentheses;
In table 3 we have included the generalized individual effects - i.e. the empirical
independence of central banks - for the two sub-periods as well as for the whole sample
period43. The generalized effects for the entire sample period are ranked, again, from
high to low. For the whole sample period and sub-periods the rankings are given in
ita economic perfonnance is rcviewed.
~3 In table 3 the thrce typrs of centrnl hanks arc again separated by double lines.zo
parentheses. From this table it appears that the overall ranking dces not change a lot. The
class of strongly independent central banks is still the same. One noticeable result is that
in the second sub-period Australia joined Italy in the group of dependent central banks.
We cannot draw conclusions from this because we already saw that the F-statistic to test
the model was insignificant. Considering this, it is noticeable that the point estimations,
though not being very precise, give roughly the same pattern as in the first sub-period and
the whole sample period. Furthermore, the ranking of intermediate independent central
banks has slightly changed between the two sub-periods. This is not surprising, because
the differences within this class are small. It is interesting to note, though, that the
differences between the three groups have become smaller from [he first to the second
sub-period in the sense that the extreme values for the individual generalized effects
(EMP) lie closer together. This may point to a convergence of independence of central
banks. On the other hand, it may point to a slightly different value for 55~. Further-
more, according to table 3, there is no evidence of big changes in the ranking of central
banks with respect to each other. Therefore, we conclude that there is no evidence of
significant changes over time in the country-specific effects (CBI)45
We now have proxies for actual independence of central banks which, appmxi-
mately, appear to be constant over time. In section 1 we also discussed some indices of
legal independence4ó. It is interesting to confront these measures with each other. In
44
OS
To see that this is more likely we consider the generalized individual effect again. EMPi - s0 t
(35CBIi. For ease of notation we normalized ~5 to one. Now, we abandon this normalization for a
moment. In fact, there exist three different effects which cannot be disentangled. In estimating reaction
function (2) [he EMPi's are chosen in a way that gives the best fit. This means [ha[ we implicitly
estimated ~p, ~5 and the CBIi's. We only can guess after the underlying causes of different estimated
values for the EMPi's. A lower value for So in tlie first sub-period may have caused the more cegative
values for EMPi in this sub-period. In the same way, a value of (35 closer to zero may have caused the
values for EMPi to converge from the first to the second sub-period. No[e that the values of ~ and (35
do not have to be changed significantly to cause the differences between the EMPi values in both sub-
periods. Only Ihe point estimations may be somewhat differenL In other words, the country-epecific
effects (CBIi) do not have to be changed significantly. Because the ranking dces not change a lot
between the two sub-perials it is even likely that the independence of central banks in particular coun-
tries did no[ change much.
This is confirmed by applying the Chow stability test. Computing this test statistic for the paneldata
estimations - i.e. equations (10), (I1) and ( 12) - gives 0.598 which dces not exceed 1.70 which is the
55ó significance level of the Fdistribution with 14 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 512 in the
denominxtur.
~ Of course, also legal dependence may change when central bank laws are ad'usted. At this J point it is
interesting that recen[ly an independent panel proposed a change in the law of the United Kingdom. See21
table 4 we repeat table 1 but we insert our measure of actual central bank independence
and we order the countries - according to our measure of actual independence - from the
country with the most independent central bank to the country with the least independent
central bank47.
Roll (1993). The intention of this proposal is to make the central bank more independent. At this
moment the government has responsibility over the monetary policy. The major change due to thia
proposal would be that the central bank will uJce over the responsibility for monetary policy. The
government, though, may override the central bank's objective of price stability in extreme situatiom
and only by Parliamentary approval and for a finite fixed time. Following this propoaal the iodepen-
dence of the central bank will certainly increase rolative to the preeent aituation. To whicó extent,
though, is not clear yet. The Bank of England now has an ES-index of 2. Implementing this proposal -
i.e. changing the sWtutes - would raise this index lo ) or 4. Thia depends on the actusl practice of
monetary policy. If the actual execution of [he law would be that the right of overriding in practice dces
not appear then the central bank is - de facto - responsible for monetary policy and ahould aim at price
stability. Other procedures being equal Ihe ES-index would then be 4. Thia may be compared to the
situation of the NClllerland5 WhCrC IIIC Minister of Finance has the right to give direc[ions to the central
bank. This right to give dirnctions has never been exercised till now. See Eijffinger and Schaliag
(1993a, p. 75). However, if the practice appears lo be tha[ the right of overriding is used at aome
uccasions the tinal authority will lie in hands of both government and cental bank and the ES-index
would only increase to J. If actual policy amounls to frequen[ly uaing the right of overriding then the
government will maint:tin its final authority for monetary policy and the ES-index would not change.
Of course, we will not include Sweden in this table because we also excluded Swedea wheo determin-
ing the rmpirical indrpendencr of central banks. Note further that the three groupa of central banks
(xtrongly indrprndent,intrrmediatn independent and dependenp are separated in the table 4 by a double
line.zz
Table 4
Empirical and legal indices of central bank independence.






Netherlands -0.33 4 2 2 3 6 4
Switzerland -0.40 5 4 4 3 5 7
German -0.43 5 4 4 3 6 7
United States -0.68 3 3 3 3 5 7
Unitt~ Kin dom -0.70 2 2 2 2 1 5
Ja an -0.72 3 3 3 1 1 5
Canada -0.73 1 2 2 I 4 7
France -0.77 2 2 2 1 2 5
Australia -0.87 1 1 1 1 3 6
Ital -1.16 2 2 1.5 3 4 1
EMP : Empirical independence;
ES : Eijffinger-Schaling index;
BP : Bade-Parkin index;
AL : Alesina index;
GMT : Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini index;
From table 4 we see that most measures of legal independence coincide rather well
with actual independence48. The correlation between our measure of actual inde-
pendence and the indices of lega] independence from table 1(or table 4~ are givcn in tablt:
5. We also tested whether these Pearson correlation ccefficients are significantly posit-
ive49. The values for this Pearson correlation statistic are also given in table 550
as
49
This is consistent with the observation of Cukierman (1992, p. 419) that legal independeoce is a good
measure for actual independence in developed countries. He found evidence, however, that legal independence and actual independence are two differen[ things in lower developed counlries. He suggests the turnover of central bank governors a.c a measure of actual independence of central banks in this latter group of countries.
Notice that this is a one-sided test. The null hypothesis is no - or negative - correlation and the alternative hypothesis is positive correlation.23
Table 5
Pearson correlation test for positive correlation between empirical and legal central
bankindependence.
Correlation of empirical





ES index 0.762" 3.323
BP index 0.560' 1.912
AL index 0.645' 2.386
GMT Polic index 0.349 1.052
GMT Political index 0.490 1.208
GMT Economic index 0.555' 1.886
..
: significant for a-0.05;
: signiticant for a~-0.01;
From table 5 appears that our judgement is confirmed by the correlations. All
indices show a positive relationship with actual independence. The ES index has the
highest ccefficient of correlation with the measure of actual independence. Moreover, the
FS index is the only indez that shows a significantly positive relation with actual indepen-
dence on a level of 14'0. So, the ES index of legal independence is the best proxy for the
measure of actual independence that we estimatedst. The BP, AL and GMT Economic
so
St
Thr Pearson corrrlation trst statistic is defined by




Wr havr 10 countrirs in uur sample. So, n- 10. Under the assumption that the numerical values for
empirical indeprndrnce and lhe Irgal index of centrxl hank indrpendence are drawn from a bivaria[e
normal distribution the Pearson correlation test statistic follows a t-0istribution with n-2 degrces of
freedom. In our case thr critical values for the Pearson [est statistic are 1.860 on a 596 level and 2.896
on a 146 level. This corresponds to critical levels for the correlation ccefficient of 0.549 respectively
0.715.
This is not remarkablr in thr light of the fact that the ES-index is the only index that tries to grab some
of thr actual implrmentation of central bank laws. Also our empirical index is based on actual
behaviour of crntral banks. So, apparen[ly, Eijffinger and Schaling aucceeded in creating an index that24
index show a positive relation on a level of Sqo. So, these legal indices are also relatively
good indicators for actual independence52. Finally, for the GMT Policy index and the
GMT Political index we did not find a significant positive correlation.
5. EVALUATION
At this point it is worthwhile to summarize what we have done so faz. The
intentions of this research were twofold. Firstly, are we able to measure actual indepen-
dence of central banks and, secondly, can we tell something about the trade-off between
inflation and economic growth given this degree of central bank independence? After
trying to deduce both intentions at the same time with the use of symmetrical and asym-
metrical reaction functions per country, we felt strongly that this approach did not bring
us far. Within this chapter we decided to use a paneldata analysis. Doing this, results
were obtained for actual independence of central banks which were intuitively appealing.
So, we reached our first goal. This, however, was at the expense of the second goal of
this research. The use of paneldata restricted the response to inFlation and economic
growth data for all countries to be the same, apart from the fixed individual effect.
Therefore, we will investigate the effects of central bank independence on the mean (and
variance) of the rate of inflation, the economic growth rate and the money mazket rate in
the following section.
6. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Why is the concept of central bank independence so important? The answer lies,
basically, in the ongoing 'rules versus discretíon' debate. Monetary policy-makers are
52
comprises legal independence as well as [he actual implementation of the law. I[ should be noled,
however, that legal indices only change when central bank (aws are changing and that these changes are
easily [o identify. The ES-index, though, is somewhat more difficult to construct and is likely to change
more frequently while these changes are more difticult to identify.
At firs[ sight, i[ may look strange Ihat the AL index perfonns better a.~ a proxy for actual independence
than, for instance, the BP index. Is this a contradiction of the fact [hat the AL index is internally
inconsistent? This is not [he case. The AI index is internally inconsistent because ttaly is downgraded for the wrong reasons. The fact that Italy is downgraded was expected to correspond more to reality.
This is conftrmed by the results.25
confronted with a time-consistency problem53. The optimal policy (zero inflation) is
time-inconsistent, because a policy-maker - which values surprise inflation positively - is
always tempted to create surprise inflation54. The time-consistent discretionary policy,
however, is sub-optimal. Kydland and Prescott (1977, p. 475) show thaC "Doing what is
best, given the current situation, results in an ezcessive level of inflation, but unem-
ployment is no lower than it would be if inflation (possibly de,~lation or price stability)
were at the socinlly optimal rate". Therefore, they advocate the use of rules instead of
policy by discretion. In words of Sijben (1992, p. 236): "Kydland and Prescott point out
that a credible and steady preannounced monetary policy rule always generates a better
pay-off in terms of inflatinn and emplt)yment than a discretionary policy, when the macro-
economic outcomes are dependent on the expectations with regard to future monetary
policy". This conclusion is based on the fact that submitting to the temptation of organiz-
ing surprise inflation will induce higher inflationary expectations and, thereby, costs for
the long term. These costs consist of either accommodating the inflationary expectat-
ions55, or not accommodating which results in an unemployment rate above the natural




Especially, when [he government is designing monetary policy there is a time-consistency problem.
Governmen[s are short-sigh[ed, like to be reelec[ed and will, therefore, sacrifice long term benefifs from
price stability for short [enn gains from surprise inFlation.
This [emptation is not necessarily the resul[ of the employment motive. The employment motive is
based on Ihe negative relation between deviations of the natural level of unemployment and unexpec[ed
inFlation. This in turn is based on the short term Phillips-curve or on the supply function in the context
of the contract theory with price and waga rigidity. See Sijben (1992), p. 237. Surprise inflation can
also be attractive because of the nominal debt motive. This amounts to the fact that inflation diminishes
real government debt when governmenl debl is nominated in nominal [erms. Yet another motive is the
one of financial stability. Cukiertnan (t992, pp. 117-118) states tha[ central banks may compromise on
[heir objectiva of price sWbility to smuuth interest rates and to reduce the likelihood of financial instabil-
ity. Yrt anothrr mutivr to intl:ue may be to tinance budgat deficit.c through monetary financing.
Accommodating inFlationxry expectations makes these expectations self-fulfilling. This raises the
question: what are the costs of inflation? This is somewhat unclear. Barro and Gordoo (1983a, p. 104)
sGte that 'aldtough peaple grnerally regardinftation as very castly, economists havt not presented vtry
canvineing arguntenrs to explain tltese costs'. Rogoff (1985, p. 1174) notes that "the carts ofinjtation
include tlu adnunistrative casr.c af posting new prices and the costs ojadjusting the tax systtm ta be
fufh' neutra! with rrsprcr m injlnrian". Furthennore, there are also the so-called 'shce-leather costs' of
inFlation, i.e. high intlatiou forces agents to economize on their holdings of non-interest bearing money.
Alw, intlation diuorts the infunnation content of prices and undennines an efficient allocation of
resources. Finally, Roll (1993, p. 5) remarks "High injlarion is also inevitably uncertain injlation.
Uncertainry erodes confidrnce, jorrshortens rhe tinu leoriton for investmeru decisions, obscures the
injorntation in prices as a signat m change behaviour, and atlows substantial buJ unfortseen redistribu-
tton oj inconu and wealrh" and concludes that 'injlation danwges the real economy'. For a recent
article on theory and evidence of the costs of inFlation see Driffill, Mizon and Ulph (1990).26
inflation against the long term costs.
Of course, the optimal solutíon - i.e. zero inflation - may be achieved by a binding
commitment to a zero-inFlation rule. This, however, is either impossible or undesira-
blesb. After recognizing this, Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) show that there may
exist a reputational equilibrium with a low but sustainable rate of inflation. They argue
that although a monetary policy-maker is always tempted to organize surprise inflation, he
also has to recognize the costs induced by the translation of this surprise inflation into
higher inflationary expectations. As long as this enforcement is larger than the temptation
the announced policy will be credible. This means that a zero inflation ra[e is unrealistic
because, in general, the temptation to cheat - i.e. to create surprise inflation - will offset
the enforcement. So, a zero inflation policy is not credible and an inflationary bias is
inevitable. The question is then which inflation rates are credible? By behaving as a
strong policy-maker - i.e. by not giving in to short term gains of surprise inflation - the
policy-maker is able to built up a good reputations~. A reputation as strong policy-
maker that gives no room for inflationary processes will lead to corresponding inflation-
ary expectations. The installation of an independent institute will enlarge the reputation of
this policy. Therefore, an independent central bank will contribute to the mitigation of the
inflationary bias induced by the time-consistency problem58.
Summarizing, governments always face a trade-off between surprise inflation and




This is undesirable because in case of a binding commitment to a zero inflation rate there is no room at
all to respond to supply shocks. See Rogoff (1985).
See also Backus and Driffill (1985) who are explicitly modelling reputa[ion by a learning mechanism.
This amounts to the public thinking in lenns of probabilities for the policy-maker being 'weak' or
'strong'. They also conclude thu[ "rhe analysis sugge.ctc thar qovernmentr muy try ta appnint cenrru(
bankers rvirh repurntions fnrfighring inflation, even ijdreir own prejerrnce.r place posítive weight an
emplovnunr" (p- 53~.
We already mentioned Ihat especially governments are confronted by a time~onsistency problem. In
general, there is a time~onsistency problem when the policy-maker who designs monetary policy
benefits from surprise inflation. Strictly speaking also Ihe most independent central banks are not com-
pletely independent and they [oo are confron[ed wi[h a time-consistency problem. The public knows,
however, that they are tnore inFla[ion-averse than the government and that they have a lot of indepen- dence such that they wíll not easy give in substantially to inflationary pressures. The fact that also Ihe
most independent central barilcs will not be completely independent is put in[o words in Roll (1993, p.
36) who states [hat "cany~lete independence could never be achieved óecause it is always open ro Purliamenl ta repeul rhe lrl;i.dation Nmt inirially confrrs drar independence" and "a second reason wlry
independence nece.rsarilv is lintited: in pracrice no governntenr is ever wrlling to cede all control over exclrange rate policy".z7
the long run the policy-maker will end up with high inflation and unemployment at its
natural leve159. This situation is not op[imal because the same level of employment can
be reached with zero inflation. To convince the public that the government is well-
meaning in restraining inFlation it is beneficial to establish an independent central bank
which takes care of the anti-inflation policy. However, Rogoff (1985, p. 1169) notes, that
- although it is indeed beneficial to have an independent central bank which is more
inflation-averse than the public - an infinite weight to the price stability objective is also
sub-optimal because of the high variance in employment when supply shocks are large.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991, p. 375) state that having a central bank is
like having a'free lunch'. They introduce this term to denote that the greater the indepen-
dence of the central bank the lower the average inFlation rate will be, but without implica-
tions for the average economic growth rate. So, there are obvious benefits of having an
independent central bank but there are no apparent costs. This will be examined in this
section.
What other relations are indicated by the theory. Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b)
derive some propositions on basis of a single-stage Phillips-curve monetary policy game
with supply shocks. They claim that central bank independence is negatively related with
the mean and variance of inflation, not related to the mean economic growth rate and
positively related with respect to the variance of economic growth. This is intuitive
bec,ause the more independent a central bank the more credible - and effective - its policy
directed at a low and stable inflation rate. Moreover, on basis of the Phillips-curve
analysis, it is clear that in the long run the mean level of economic growth will equal its
natural rate no matter how dependent or independent the central bank is. Supply shocks,
however, are absorbed by the rate of economic growth and not by the inflation rate such
that the variance of economic growth is likely to be positively related to central bank
independence.
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b) test these propositions by regressing the average
inflation rate, the variance of the inflation rate, the average economic growth rate and the
variance of the economic growth rate on the Bade-Parkin indez, the Alesina index, the
59 Behind this is the Phillips-curve analysis. On the short term [here is a tradeoff between surprise
inflation and unemployment but in the long run the employment is at its natural rate despite of the
inflation rate.28
GMT Political index and their own index of central bank independence~. They find
that the theoretical relation between central bank independence and the average inflation
and economic growth rate is confirmed by the empirical results, while the variability in
inflation and economic growth do not give significant relationships with central bank
independencebt. We will estimate the same regressions for a somewhat different sample
period and we also use the etnpirical index of central bank independence, and the other
two Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini indices (i.e. the GMT Policy and the GMT
Economic index). Our hypothesis is that the empirical index is a better approximation of
actual central bank independence than any of the other indices that measure legal indepen-
dence of central banks. Therefore, using our measure of actual independence will give
more meaningful and - we expect - more pronounced results.
We just mentioned that the statemen[ 'having a central bank is like having a free
lunch' will be examined in this section. Furthermore, it is interesting to test whether
central bank independence has any effect on the mean and variance of the money market
rate. Especially, the relation between the empirical index and the average money market
rate is interesting in light of the meaning of this empirical index. The empirical index
actually measures the tendency of keeping the money market rate high (relative to the
inflation and economic growth data). This upward pressure on the money market rate
dces not mean that it is higher in absolute value. We just mentioned the negative
relationship between central bank independence and average inflation. So, although, there
is a greater upward pressure on the money market rate because of the independence there
is less upward pressure on behalf of the inflation data. So, it is not clear a priori which
countries will show the highest money market rates. Those with independent central banks
or those with more dependent central banks. From a theoretical point of view there are
two possible visions on whether a more independent ccntral bank will Icad to highcr ur
lower interest rates. Nominal interest rates may be lower because of less inflation
uncertainty and a lower expec[ed rate of inflation or higher to keep the inflation rate low.
This question is important because of the relation between the level of interest rates and
~ See sec[ion 1 for a discus.cion of these indices.
bt
De Haan and Sturm (1992), however, did find a negative significant relationship between central bank independence and the variability of intlation for the period reaching from 1961 till 1987.29
the level of investments (and consumption)62. Therefore, we investigate whether higher
central bank independence will lead to higher or lower money mazket ratesó3. The
money mazket rate is not the rate against which loans aze made for investment plans but
the preferred habitat theory of the term structure states that long term interest rates can be
seen as consisting of expected short term interest rates over the same period plus a term
premium that responds to demand and supply conditions~. Through this mechanism the
money market rate - which is a short term interest rate - is linked to long term interest
rates.
Summarizing, we tested the relation between the mean and the variability of the
inflation rate, the rate of economic growth and the money mazket rate, on the one hand,
and all indices (legal and actual) from table 4, on the other handbs. The results are
given below in table 6. These results are in line with the results of Eijffinger and Schaling
(1993b)~. Obviously, the results confirm the inverse relationship between txntral bank






It should be noted, though, that it is not clear what determines investments. It is likely that the real
interest rate is more important in determining invesunents than the nominal interest rate. Thia implies
that if central bank independence leads lo lower inflation and concomitant inflationary expectations as
well as [o a lower nominal money market rate the toul effect of central bank independence on the real
interest rate stíll is undetennined.
At the same time we also analyza whether central bank independence has any effect on the variability of
the money market rate. This is investigated because a lower variability in the money market rate
contributes to more tinancial stability.
See Mishkin (1992), p. 146.
In appendix A the data that ware used for the mean and variance of the inflation rate, lhe ecooomic
growth rate and the money market rate are given. Also is described how theae averagea and variancea
have been computad.
Eijftinger and Schaling (19936) estimated a subset of the rcgressions given in table 6. They did not uee
the mean antl r~rianct uf tht money market rate a.c dtpendent variable. Furthermore, they did oot use
the GMT Policy indrx, the GMT Economic index and, of course, they did not use the empirical index
as indrpendent variable. They alu, considercd a slighdy different sample period: namely from 1972 till
1990 or 1991 and sub-samples roaching till and from 1982.
The GMT indices, huwever, do not give a significant relationship. Thia is equally true for the relation
between the othrr dependent variahlea and these three indices except for a significant relationahip on a
S96 luvel brtween the GMT Econumic indtx and the variability of inFlation. So, we may conclude that
theae GMT indices do nut explain the mean and variance of inflation, economic growth and the money
market rate. Thereforc, they arc nut discussed extensively. It should be noted, though, that the signs of
[he coefti~ients for the GMT indices do also indicate a negative relationship betweeo average inflation
and cantral bank indapendence.30
the mean inflation rate. The empirical index gives the most strong and significant
relationshipbg. Also the ccefficient of determination is higher for the empirical index
than for other indices. Approximately 7296 of the sample variation in the mean inflation
rate is explained by the empirical index of actual independence. This implies that the
index of actual independence alone explains almost comple[ely the average intlation rate
among the sample countries. Considering the variance of the inflation rate all signs
indicate an inverse rela[ionship tooó9 - except for the GMT Policy index - but only the
GMT Economic index gives a significant relationship. So, [he overall picture is that there




Notice that the constent is insignificant and negative for the empirical index, where the intercept for all
other indices is significant and positive. This is not remarkable because the empirical index takes
negative values, while all other indices only take posi[ive values.
This is not remarkable in the light of [he fact tha[ low inFlation and low infla[ion variability, in general,
appeartogether. See, for instance, De Haan and S[urm (1992), p. 311.
70 The empirical index, though, dces give a significan[ inverse relationship on a]09b level.31
Table 6
Economic performance and the indices of independence: 1977-1990.
Enpktulory Avrnge V~rience AvenBc V~ri~me Avrnye V~riance
V~ri~bks InOalion In0alion Output Output Money Money
Re1a Rete Gtowlh Grow~h Matrket M~rlcet
Rne Rete Rate Rete
ConpaN 10.483" 1.367' 2.742" 1.348 15.348" 9.423"
J3.3991 12.6361 14.3231 12.163J 19.6411 IS-9~1
BP -1.877' -0.197 -0.044 -0.22J -2.499" -1.075
,2.576J l0.991! IO.ISF1 10 x2u1 [4.t821 I!.796!
Adj. R2 0.383 -0.002 -0.120 -0.036 0.647 0.198
SE 2.123 0.566 0.694 0.783 1.742 1.746
Consunt 10.638" 1.449' 2.731" 1.438 13.223" 9.337"
16.390J 13.0301 14.379) 12.0961 j11.193J [6.613]
AL -1.987' -0.230 -0.049 -0.163 -2.499" -1.144
13.1331 11.2761 10.214J (0.7001 14.8361 I2.0871
Adj. R~ 0.493 0.065 -0.119 -0.060 0.713 0.272
SE 1.925 O.S48 0.693 0.792 1.370 1.664
Conuant 6.872' 0.603 3.413" 0.324 11.349" 7.108"
13.1361 11.7391 17.704J 10.8691 13.2401 14.4721
GMT Policy -0.313 0.038 -0.372 0.222 -1.163 -0.t78
10.3431 10.1881 11.9341 10.6481 [1.2171 I0.237]
Adj. R~ -0.083 -0.120 0.234 -0.032 0.031 -0.116
SE 2.822 0.600 0.374 0.782 2.SS6 2.060
CoMant 7.360" 1.436" 3.303" 0.299 11.320" 6.540"
13.8611 13.7921 17.6761 f0.366J 13.4401 14.3641
GMT Political -0.484 -0.149 -0.181 0.187 -0.600 0.033
11.013) 11.616J 11.7341 11.4621 I1.184J (0.144]
Adj. R'- 0.003 0.132 0.182 0.112 0.043 -0.122
SE 2.706 0.322 0.393 0.725 2.870 2.065
Conwnt 9.396" 1.936" 2.842" 1.186 12.329" 7.980"
13.6391 14.2531 14.113j 11.459j 14.4201 13.960j
GMT Economic -0.703 -0.193' -0.039 -0.036 -0.633 -0.231
11.6051 f2.4361 10.3211 (0.2321 11.2741 [0.6311
Adj. R~ 0.149 0.334 -O.I I I -0.116 0.063 -0.069
SE 2.J99 0.456 0.691 0.81J 2.BJ5 2.015
Consunt 9.750" 1.316" 2.986" 0.783 14.083" 6.974"
17.526J 1J.J791 16.3JJ1 11.3721 114.398J 17.7081
ES -1.413" -0.154 -0.1?7 0.074 -1.779" -0.800
13.4161 II.238J 10.8401 10.4071 13.6941 12.1301
Adj. RZ 0.343 0.036 -0.014 -0.102 0.777 0.287
SE 1.832 0.551 0.667 0.808 1.383 1.646
Conrtsm -0.710 -0.094 1.903' 1.972' 2.489 3.290
(O.SIOJ 10.2051 13.0651 12.7091 11.4201 12.1221
~P -9.573" -1.441 -1.073 1.386 -9.740" -5.074~
14.9J11 12.2591 11.2411 11.395I 13.9891 12.349j
AJj. R~ 0.722 0.313 0.037 0.093 0.624 0.334
SE 1.430 0.470 0.637 0.732 1.799 1.59132
abwlute t-valuee between breckcts;
; : aignificant for o-5~;
~~ : significant for a-1 ~;
Adj. RZ : Adjurted coefficient of determitalion;
SE : Stendard Error of the rcgtcasion.
There is no significant relationship either between central bank independence and
average economic growth. This is in line with the statement that having an independent
central bank is like having a free lunch. It should be noticed, though, that all signs are
negative. Considering the variance of output growth the signs are different over the
indices and there is no significant relationship. The empirical index, though, gives a
positive sign. This positive sign is in line with the theory. A stable inflation rate can only
be achieved if shocks are transmitted to the rate of economic growth.
The average money market rate is obviously negatively related to central bank
independence (legal as well as actual), although the GMT indices do not show a signifi-
cant relationship. So, one may conclude that having an independent central bank also
results in having a lower money market rate on average. This relationship is strongest for
the empirical index~t and considered in the light of representing the upward pressure on
the money market rate of independent central banks it highlights that these banks are
successful in significantly lowering the average inflation rate. The variability of the
money market rate also seems to give a negative relation with central bank independence.
Although, this relation is only significant for the empirical measure of central bank
independence. This implies that an independent central bank contributes to a stable
financial system and mitigates uncertainty concerning the money market rate.
The fact that the empirical index gives the most or one of the most strong relation-
ships when theory indicates there exists a relationship is rcasun for uti tu ctmtaudc tnat tht:
legal indices do attempt to measure independence but that actual independence is best
approximated by our measure of empirical independence72. Summarizing, an indepen-
7?
Notice that [he intercept in the regression of averege as well as variance of the money market ra[e on
the empirical index is insignificant contrary to the other cases. This difference is caused by the fact thal
the empirical index is negaiive and all other indices are positive.
One might criticize tht regression analyses in this section by stating that we are closing the circle. First,
we estimated empirical independence on basis of data for inflation and economic growth and then we
related this measure to - averages and variances of - the same data. It should be noted, Ihough, tha[ the33
dent central bank will contribute to lower inflation without effects on the economic
growth rate. So the statement of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini that having an
independent central bank is like having a free lunch is confirmed. An independent central
bank will also contribute - on average - to a lower money market rate and lower variabil-
ity in the money market rate73.
73
empirical index mrasurex the upwarJ prcssure of the money markat rate after movemenls in the money
mnrkrt rate on brhalf of the inn:dion rate and tha rate of economic grow[h have been removed. So, the
rclatiun wc tiwnd hctwc.~n rmpiric:d independence xnd economic performance is not pre-imposed by the
method of rcsearch. This is contirmed by the fact that - although lass pronounced - the indices of legal
central bank independence indicate the sama relations.
See appendix B for a graphic illustration of the discussed relations between the mean and variance of
the inflation rate, the rate of economíc growth and the money market rate, on the oce hand, and ectual
independence (measured by our empirical index), on the other hand.34
APPENDIX A: MEASURES OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1977-1990)
COUNTRY Average Variance Average Variance Average Variance
Inflation Inflation Output Output Money Money
Rate Rate Growth Growth Market Market
Rate Ra[e
Australia 8.0689 0.5157 2.9653 1.2521 12.5022 9.1473
Canada 6.5291 0.5765 2.8036 0.9433 11.1037 8.3870
France 7.1328 1.0494 2.3522 0.3171 10.5000 7.0110
Germany 2.8855 0.3855 2.4330 1.2700 6.5783 6.3981
Italy 10.5334 1.8515 2.7807 0.5747 12.7391 9.5540
Japan 2.7192 0.7046 4.2737 0.4015 6.3876 3.1252
Netherlands 2.9712 0.4911 2.0183 2.8862 6.9587 4.9255
Switzerland 3.3057 0.4844 2.1238 0.2212 4.2826 5.8134
United Kingdom 7.7945 1.9347 2.2037 1.1139 11.3017 6.8556
United States 5.9584 0.8551 2.3577 0.9309 8.6637 6.1349
The data for economic performance which have been used for the regressions
reported in table 6 are given above. These averages and variances are calculated from
quarterly data reaching from the third quarter of 1977 till the last quarter of 1990. So,
they are based on 54 observations. This particular period has been chosen because it
coincides with the sample period used in the paneldata estimations. This because of the
conviction that the interpretations in section 7 are most meaningful when the analyses of
the behaviour of central banks - given by reaction function (10) and table 2- are as
comparable as possible with the data for economic performance. Consequently, the rate of
inflation and the rate of economic growth are calculated from quarter to quarter. These
data, however, are represented on annual basis and, therefore, the quarterly averages
have been multiplied by four. Note that this means a slight underestimation compared
with the more usual way of calculating the annual rate of inflation and the annual rate of
economic growth. In calculating these rates one takes the change in percentages of the
present level compared to the level one year before. The fact that quarterly data have
been used in the paneldata estimations and [he knowledge that all ten countries are treated
in the same manner convinced us to use these data here too. Of course, the averages of
the money market rate do not need to be multiplied. The variances of the rate of inflation,
the rate of economic growth and the money market rate are based on their quarterly
observations and not adjusted to represent them on annual basis. This again has been done35
because the assumption implicit in reaction function (10) that central banks also calculate
the inflation rate and the rate of economic growth on a quarterly basis and act according
to these quarterly data.36
APPENDIX B: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMA-
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